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The Resource-Based View of the Firm and the Labour Theory of Value 
The paper argues that the principal components of the Resource- based view (R-BV) 
of the firm are not a sufficient basis for a complete and consistent theory of firm 
behaviour. Two important missing elements are governance arrangements and value 
theory. Whilst these missing elements have been acknowledged separately in the 
literature, their complementary interaction with the commonly accepted components 
of the R-BV has yet to be fully explored. This paper argues that there are significant 
opportunities to develop a more integrated approach, thereby uniting substantial 
strands of the strategy and economics literatures to produce a unified view of strategy 
and move towards a resource based theory of the firm. Specifically the paper argues 
for the inclusion of labour process theory, asymmetric information and the analysis of 
risk and the classical labour theory of value. The combination of these elements 
shows that a resource-based theory must unite the process and content elements of 
strategy, through the simultaneous interaction of labour management processes, the 
determinants of sustained competitive advantage (SCA), and relations with capital 
markets. 
The argument presented shows how value originates in the productive process 
and is transmitted as rents to organizational and capital market constituents. The 
detailed assumptions are sufficient to suggest an integrated resource-based theory of 
corporate strategy. The principal assertion in the paper is not that the labour theory of 
value is true per se, only that it is at least as good as competing theories, but that only 
if it is assumed to be true can we progress to construct a consistent resource-based 
theory of the firm. Without these links to the labour theory of value and labour 
process theory, and mechanisms of corporate governance, the R-BV remains merely a 
view and not a theory, because it lacks a consistent basis for asset valuation. The 
theory also explains that the roots of SCA lie in the labour process, but with the 
corollary that maximizing the associated investment in tacit knowledge and associated 
difficult to replicate assets is fundamentally inconsistent with the objective of 
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Strategy lacks a consistent definition (Bracker, 1980, Mintzberg and Quinn, 1991, p.3, 
Hendry, 2000), draws on a number of super-ordinate (eg economics and sociology) 
and specialist disciplines (eg marketing, HRM), and takes on approaches based on 
process and content. In view of these competing and possibly divergent tendencies, is 
an integrated theory of strategy possible? A particularly important recent 
development, from the perspective of this paper because it provides a possible vehicle 
for producing an integrated theory of strategy, is the resource-based view (R-BV). As 
in other areas of strategy research, however, it is unclear whether strategy scholars 
themselves agree on the R-BV's basic issues and premises (Hoopes et al, 2003). 
More specifically, there has been much recent debate on the question of 
whether or not the R-BV requires a theory of value.  According to the R-BV, 
organizations are bundles of resources (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Rumelt, 1984), 
which are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and imperfectly substitutable (Barney, 
1991). That said, despite much conceptual research effort, participants in the debate 
have yet to reach a consensus on the circumstances of where, why and when a 
resource is valuable (Miller and Shamsie, 1996, p.539). According to Makadok 
(2001) and Makadok and Coff, 2002) several resource-based theorists, such as Barney 
(1986), Peteraf (1993), and Collis and Montgomery (1995) offer explanations of 
resource value. Bowman and Ambrosini (2000) suggest these explanations are 
insufficient and set out a framework incorporating value creation and value capture. 
Priem (2001) argues that existing theories deal only with the value capture element 
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but do not explain how value is created in the first place. For Makadok and Coff, 
(2002) R-BV works with value capture but does not need a theory of value creation, 
especially not a theory based on consumer utility.  
The fundamental reason for the diverse views and apparent impasse, as 
outlined in this paper, is that to understand value there is a requirement to integrate 
ownership, information asymmetry and the effectiveness or otherwise of governance 
mechanisms designed to enforce ownership claims, into the R-BV. As Makadok 
(2003) suggests, future research on the genesis of competitive advantage should 
examine agency and governance issues along with, not apart from, resource-based 
issues. This paper goes further suggesting resources and governance must also be 
considered along with a consistent theory of value. Such integration completes the 
theory, and also therefore illustrates the underlying link between resource value and 
SCA. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section two below provides a 
brief summary of the relationship between the R-BV and other theoretical 
perspectives that rely on notions of value. A subsequent section presents an integrated 
model illustrating proposed relationships between the principal theoretical 
components. A final section draws conclusions. 
 
The relationship between RBV and other theoretical perspectives 
Where the R-BV literature has dealt with the question of value, it has done so under 
three broad headings. These are the utility approach, examined primarily from the 
perspective of the customer, stakeholder theory, sometimes conflated with utility 
theory, and finally and most importantly from the point of view of the current paper, 
approaches that link asset value to intra-organizational processes. The latter, as argued 
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below, present an opportunity to link R-BV with modern theories of governance and 
classical economic theories of value, thereby advancing an integrated theory of 
strategy. First, each of the three approaches are discussed in turn to show why only 
labour based approaches offer the opportunity for an integrated theory. 
 
Economic theory and utility 
In contrast to economic theory, which explains performance differentials in terms of 
product and market structure, the R-BV focuses on the internal characteristics of the 
firm (Lockett and Thompson, 2001). In the search for an associated theory of value, 
however, many researchers argue that the R-BV implies resource value depends upon 
relationships with a specific market environment (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). 
Similarly Barney (1991, p.105) suggests that a resource is valuable to the extent that 
`it exploits opportunities and/or neutralizes threats in a firm's environment'. A 
connected argument is that resources are valuable if they enable a firm to satisfy 
needs at lower costs than competitors (Barney, 1986; Peteraf, 1993). Barney (1991, p. 
106) also suggests that resources are valuable `when they enable a firm to conceive of 
or implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness'. Elsewhere a 
resource has been defined as valuable if it enables customer needs to be better 
satisfied (Bogner and Thomas, 1994; Verdin and Williamson, 1994). Conner (1991, p. 
132) summarizes these strands pointing out that, from a resource-based perspective 
`obtaining [above normal] returns requires either that (a) the firm's product be 
distinctive in the eyes of buyers (e.g. the firm's product must offer to consumers a 
dissimilar and attractive attribute/price relationship in comparison to substitutes), or 
(b) that the firm selling an identical product in comparison to competitors must have a 
low cost position'.   
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The principal weakness of these approaches is that value depends upon a 
definition of customer needs (including, tautologically, access to low priced goods) 
and in any case it is difficult to see how consumers having wants differs from 
standard utility theory. As Priem (2001) therefore suggests, the R-BV is therefore 
incomplete because its explanation of value must be imported from the literature of 
other fields. There is also the more fundamental question of whether utility in any 
case constitutes the basis for a theory of value. It has been dismissed as a tautology by 
some prominent economists (Robinson, 1963), and more importantly refuted as a 
theory of capital value and the rate of profit (Harcourt, 1969). Neo-classical 
economics has ignored rather than responded to these fundamental criticisms (Tinker, 
1980), and any attempt to develop a resource based theory of the firm on neo-classical 
foundations necessarily faces the same problem, not least because capital values and 
profit rates are central to the R-BV approach. 
  
Stakeholder theory and value 
An alternative approach that side-steps rather than addresses the weaknesses of utility 
theory is the stakeholder approach. Where the stakeholder approach is used, 
definitions of value are still predicated on notions of utility. For example Collis and 
Montgomery (1997, pp.30–31) argue that a resource is valuable when demanded by 
customers, when it cannot be replicated by competition, and when the profits it 
generates are captured by the firm (emphasis added). This is notwithstanding 
problems associated with customer utility measurement referred to above, but more 
importantly, the stakeholder approach raises the question of what in this context is the 
firm? When the idea of the firm is reified in this fashion and use value is wrapped up 
in the notion of customer utility, important gaps reappear in the R-BV. First, where a 
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resource cannot be replicated by purchase in an outside market, the implication is that 
unrealized value has been transferred into that asset in the process of its production. 
But how appropriate is it now to value these unrealized assets with reference to the 
utility of the ultimate consumer? Second, the suggestion of appropriation qua value 
capture requires the removal of the reified firm and its replacement with stakeholders. 
Once this substitution occurs, a third question now arises, who captures the profits 
and how are they valued? Coff (1999) addresses this question with the notion of 
‘nexus rents’, according to which some of the value of superior performance is 
appropriated by competing stakeholder groups. Such stakeholders earn quasi-rents 
when a factor has a higher marginal product than is required to hold it in place (Klein 
et al. 1978). Although this explains rent distribution it does not directly address the 
question of value creation. If utility is still relied upon, the effect of the stakeholder 
model is simply to multiply the number of utility functions according to the needs of 
different stakeholder groups. Managers, customers, employees etc, have different 
utility functions, and any residual return must still be valued according to the 
shareholder’s utility function. In this model, rents and one assumes value, are 
determined by market processes and do not arise from the productive process, 
although Coff’s (1999) contribution importantly highlights the role that monitoring 
relationships must play. To summarize these problems, the R-BV requires a theory of 
value that is independent of utility, or must specify a stakeholder group whose utility 
is to take precedence. 
 If for whatever reason we choose the shareholders, the problem is essentially 
to select a valuation mechanism for the profit streams earned by the firm’s resources. 
These profit streams can be capitalized if we can assume a discount rate consistent 
with the risk/return utility function of an investor. However, such an assumption 
 6
presupposes that value is created or captured according to the subjective attitudes of 
investors. 
  
Organizational processes and theories of value 
The final approach, and the one adopted in the ensuing analysis, is to argue that value 
is created from processes within the organization. According to this view, the value 
creation process creates useful outputs or use values, where new use value derives 
from the actions of people in the organization working on and with procured use 
values (Lado and Wilson, 1994; Pfeffer, 1995; Wright et al., 1994). Such an approach 
is consistent with Penrose (1959), and more recently Tsoukas (1996) and by Grant 
(1996), with their emphasis on managerial integration of knowledge. These 
approaches are consistent with classical economics and value theory, but few authors 
have made this connection in recent debates. An exception is the use-value, exchange 
value split suggested by Bowman and Ambrosini (2000, p.2), generally attributed to 
the ‘classical economists’.  
Although many researchers agree that value is generated from inside the firm 
there is disagreement as to its precise origins. Most explanations involve the notion of 
tacit knowledge but differences arise from difficulties associated with the definition of 
the term (Ambrosini and Bowman, 2001). Tacit knowledge therefore creates value for 
example as an unplanned side effect of corporate behaviour through spontaneous co-
operation (Mueller, 1996), the ability to isolate tacit attributes of organizational 
routines (Knott, 2004), or as a set of skills (Ambrosini and Bowman, 2001). 
Ambrosini and Bowman’s approach is particularly useful because it is founded on 
Polanyi’s (1966) explanation of scientific knowledge beginning with tacit knowledge 
and tacit knowledge as prior to explicit knowledge. This view is also consistent with 
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location of tacit knowledge in the context specific (Nonaka, 1991) and describes a 
process (Ambrosini and Bowman, 2001, p.813).  
Finally, as explained in the next section, these approaches are consistent with 
the labour theory of value. The emphasis is on consistency, rather than verification. It 
is beyond the scope of this paper and all the others reviewed above to demonstrate the 
conclusive truth of one value theory or another. In common to all is their requirement 
to make some assumption or other about the nature and origins of value. What the 
discussion has shown is that the labour-based approach is of some merit in itself and 
that this is sustained when weighed against competing approaches. At this stage only 
if the labour theory of value is assumed to be true can we progress to construct a 
consistent resource-based theory of the firm. 
 
Knowledge, Value, and Appropriation: An Integrated Model  
Although the labour theory of value (LTV) has a long pedigree, dating back to Smith, 
Ricardo and Marx, it’s espousal by Marx in particular suggests an unlikely starting 
point for a discipline concerned at least in part with the determinants and attributes of 
successful behaviour within the confines of the capitalist system. Marx’s categorical 
extensions of Smith and Ricardo, for example use value, have been used sparingly in 
the debates on R-BV and value, and without much reference to classical economics 
(as an exception, see Bowman, 2003). There is also the view that LTV has been 
discredited because Marx was unable to use the theory to explain why rates of profit 
should equalize across sectors through market processes (the transformation of value 
into price). Technical solutions to this problem have been suggested (Bortkiewicz, 
1949), but the residual problems also apply to neo-classical theories of value 
(Harcourt, 1969). From the perspective of this paper, the crucial residual problem is 
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that the difference between the use value arising from the mental and physical effort 
applied in the labour process and the market price of labour is unobservable at the 
level of the individual firm. This point is addressed in the model explained below. 
Another reason perhaps is that the use of Marx’s categories themselves leads 
to further debate. For example, there is disagreement amongst Marxist scholars as to 
whether Marx indeed did advocate the LTV (Rowlinson and Hassard, 2001, pp.86-
88). Hence there are differing interpretations as to whether labour power and its 
deployment in the productive process can form the basis of value. Bryer (1999) argues 
that labour, and particularly socially necessary labour, is the basis of asset valuations. 
Tinker, (1999, p.655) on the other hand suggests that Marx’s economic categories 
such as profit, wages and rents should be seen as socially relative phenomena. Whilst 
recognising these and other potential objections, the implications of Bryer’s argument 
for the R-BV are clear. If there is a fundamental link between socially necessary 
labour and asset values in a modern accounting system, as Bryer suggests, then this 
link also explains the underlying relationship between asset values and rates of return, 
and hence SCA. 
That said, to explain observed rates of return and differences between firms in 
the same industry and with similar asset bases, it is also necessary, in parallel with 
Coff’s (1999) model, to consider the possibility of rent transfer between stakeholder 
groups. Marx uses Ricardo’s definition of differential rent as ‘the difference between 
the produce obtained by the employment of two equal quantities of labour and capital’ 
(Marx, 1984, p.649). This notion of rent can be applied specifically to circumstances 
where knowledge is unevenly distributed within firms and between firms and their 
investors. Rents might therefore accrue to firm insiders or financial market insiders 
based on access to superior information. Realized returns accruing to shareholders in 
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a financial market therefore reflect both the underlying rate of profit plus or minus 
realizable managerial and labour rents.
i
According to the labour theory of value, labour markets trade in labour time 
rather than actual work done, including any tacit knowledge elements. The problem 
for management is supervising what is done with that time and this problem 
intensifies to the extent that subordinates hold tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge 
reflects value in use rather than market exchange value and employees hold their 
positions precisely because the perceived value of their tacit and other knowledge 
exceeds their market cost. In R-BV terms, the firm that employs such individuals has 
a basis for SCA because a competing firm cannot replicate the asset base through 
straightforward market exchange processes. 
The most important assumption, in line with the organizational processes 
strand of the literature reviewed above, is that the real source of value lies within the 
productive process. Because commodities are systematically sold at higher prices on 
leaving the productive process in comparison to the prices at which they enter it, there 
must be some commodity within the process that adds value systematically. Without 
this condition aggregate profits are zero and the economy is a zero sum game. At the 
same time, as noted above, labour time is priced in the market, but labour power is 
not. Specifically therefore labour time is transferred to the product with a degree of 
intensity that is a function of both physical effort and mental processes. As long as the 
labour process is defined to include both mental and physical processes, this view is 
consistent with Schumpeter’s (1934) argument that value and abnormal profits arise 
from innovation. Insofar as the value created from such mental and physical activities 
is greater than the market value of labour time, the firm has an incentive to retain the 
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employees whose individual or collective efforts generate the value. At the same time 
the firm has the basis for making abnormal returns and therefore SCA.  
From an R-BV perspective, physical effort and readily quantifiable skills are 
the resources most easily replicable. Such explicit skills are those more easily 
generated through generic training and education processes external to the firm. As 
labour processes become more deeply ingrained as tacit skills, they become more 
difficult to replicate. Ambrosini and Bowman (2001, p. 816) suggest that this gives 
rise to a continuum with explicit and deeply ingrained skills at either end. Figure 1 
uses this continuum to include tacit knowledge as a starting point, but extends the 
analysis to include the important additional questions of valorization, accountability 
and governance. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
As suggested in figure 1, there is also a continuous relationship between the 
degree of tacitness in the labour process and the ability of external stakeholders to 
monitor the separable labour processes that make up the firm and their joint 
interactions. This follows from the definition of tacit knowledge, because the process 
is less readily explainable and understood by an outsider and is consistent with the R-
BV, tacit knowledge is implicated in SCA. Therefore as tacit knowledge and potential 
degree of SCA rises under R-BV assumptions, the monitoring costs for external 
stakeholders rise. So the more tacit labour processes create assets that are unique and 
valuable, the more likely it becomes that resulting excess profits will be appropriated 
by insiders at the expense of external capital providers. 
 11
 There are several interesting corollaries arising from these relationships that 
are worth mentioning. First there is a conflict between the managerial objective of 
achieving SCA and the objective of maximizing shareholder value. Managers pursue 
rents rather than optimal growth (Rugman, and Verbeke, 2004) and these rents arise 
from their role in the labour process, as supervisors and participants. If firms are 
identified as having achieved competitive advantage by reference to accounting ratios 
corresponding to superior performance from a shareholder perspective (eg Peters and 
Waterman, 1982), it is likely that such performance is based on explicit and easily 
replicable skills and that associated competitive advantage is short-term or illusory. 
This view also contrasts with Penrose’s view that firms and their managers are 
essentially profit-orientated, and that managerial opportunism and the agency problem 
constitute only a special case (Lockett and Thompson, 2004). 
A second and related point is that monitoring costs in figure 1 also lie on a 
continuum suggesting that as the degree of tacitness rises, the probability of surplus 
appropriation by those closest to the labour process also rises. In other words the 
monitoring problem is not simply confined to the providers of external capital but is 
also faced directly by the line managers at each hierarchical level above the labour 
process. Line managers have the incentive to externalize tacit knowledge embedded in 
labour processes for which they are responsible, for example through the division of 
labour, or spend organizational resources themselves on monitoring, so that rents 
accrue at their level of the hierarchy. Insofar as line management itself is part of the 
labour process, for example where managerial action alters the product, further tacit 
knowledge arises and monitoring costs are imposed from above on progressively 
senior levels of management. Ultimately the imposition comes from the capital 
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market to the top of the hierarchy, creating a similar but separate set of monitoring 
issues discussed below. 
A third corollary is that under these assumptions the R-BV is consistent with 
labour process theory (LPT). R-BV and LPT are from divergent backgrounds within 
the strategic management literature, reflecting context and process based approaches 
respectively. To clarify this consistency, it is necessary to evaluate the assumptions 
from the labour process perspective. The most important consideration for labour 
process theorists (Knights, 1990, Wilmott, 1990) is the role of power rather than 
profit, and their consequent rejection of Marx’s value categories explains the 
divergence between LPT and the LTV (Rowlinson and Hassard, 2001, p.90). 
However, the model in figure 1 offers a reconciliation. As figure 1 suggests, because 
labour rent originates in the productive process, the labour process must include a 
valorization stage. As Bryer (2004) has pointed out, valorization has been neglected in 
the labour process literature. In terms of labour time, capital comprises accumulated 
dead labour plus the living labour time, at whatever intensity, transferred into output 
through the labour process. Capital can be conceptualized in labour hours without 
reference to valorization, but the valorization process is nonetheless the crucial link 
underpinning the relationship between tacit knowledge and monitoring costs. Precise 
valorization is the outcome of two elements, realization into monetary or exchange 
value through capital circulation (Marx, 1976, p.992-7) and the effectiveness or 
otherwise of supervisory arrangements to moderate the effects of information 
asymmetry. Asymmetry arises because workers sell but retain control over their 
‘labour power’, defined by Marx as those physical and mental capabilities, which the 
worker sets in motion whenever he produces a use-value (1976, p.271).  
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These assumptions are consistent with classical value theory and specifically 
with Marx, if the labour process is treated as part of the productive forces (Marx, 
1976, pp.285-290), which also incorporate knowledge assets, for example scientific 
expertise where applied using technology (Marx, 1974, pp.540, 699, 706). Meanwhile 
the labour process leads to inventiveness on the one hand through the imagination of 
individual labourers at the outset of the labour process (Marx, 1976, pp.284) and 
alienation through the process of specialization on the other. To the extent that 
inventiveness and knowledge can be privately appropriated, the labour process itself 
becomes a risky set of activities for administering managers and outside financial 
stakeholders.  
Arising from these risks, a fourth implication is the impact on capital market 
participants such as individual shareholders and investment managers. As suggested 
above, realization through capital circulation is assumed to be part of the valorization 
process. At the top end of the continuum where all knowledge is tacit, it is impossible 
for the investor to understand the processes whereby use values are transformed into 
exchange values through realization and thereby generated into profits. Even so where 
there is some degree of capital dependence, for example in high growth sector firms, 
insiders will have an incentive to reserve some profit and signal its availability to 
outside investors instead of appropriating it for themselves. Insofar as the labour 
process within one firm is unrelated to those governing the profits of the average firm, 
which include many explicit processes, the variation in profit will appear random and 
therefore as ‘noise’. Such randomness corresponds to the firm-specific risk. In the 
limiting case where all knowledge is tacit, all share prices become random. Under 
such conditions share prices would convey no information to investors (Grossman and 
Stiglitz, 1980). In the opposite case where all knowledge is explicit, information is 
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symmetrical and markets become thin, as there are no abnormal returns (rents) and 
there is no incentive to trade (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). Also under these 
conditions with R-BV assumptions all firms possess the same easily imitable 
resources for the same activities and there is no SCA. 
The interactions between tacit knowledge and monitoring costs are suggestive 
of some interesting contradictions within the corporate economy. Alienation, through 
excessive specialization and associated removal of intellectual content, is traditionally 
viewed as a source of exploitation by unscrupulous profit maximizing capitalists. In 
fact, in industries where such exploitation might occur, such as cotton textiles in the 
British industrial revolution or in modern China, although aggregate profit rates may 
be high, there is no basis for SCA at the level of any individual firm. In contrast, 
where the labour process has significant intellectual content, thereby creating entry 
barriers for competitors, the accrued profit to the individual maximizing capitalist 
may be still small and the rents accrued by intermediate producers and market-makers 
large, due to increased monitoring problems.
ii
 In short, because rent is the difference 
between realized price and underlying value, if labour is the source of value, 
information asymmetry is the source of rent.  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Figure 2 shows how these trade offs within a resource-based theory 
framework explain the observed level of profit and shows when and how observed 
abnormal profits are associated with SCA. Coff’s (1999, figure 1) model provides 
examples of these trade-offs locating rents specifically in stakeholder bargaining 
power, asset specificity and team complexity.  Figure 2 shows the general case that 
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follows from the above discussion, in which profits and SCA are explained jointly by 
the possession of VRIN assets in the resource base and the process of rent capture. 
The framework is derived from value theory and shows rent capture to be in direct 
and dynamic contradiction with the firm’s asset base. In the top row of the table, 
consistent with the R-BV, firms achieve SCA through their extensive VRIN asset 
base. However, observable profits differ, so that where external monitoring and 
accountability is effective the profits from SCA are above normal levels and accrue to 
external stakeholders (quadrant 1). Where monitoring and accountability are 
ineffective, rents accrue to insiders (quadrant 2). Reported profits will be normal, 
since insiders will report and distribute the level of profit required to minimal satisfy 
investors and prevent them exiting their investment and remaining surplus will be 
consumed as rents by the insiders. On the bottom row, there are no VRIN assets and 
therefore there is no basis for SCA. Because there are no VRIN assets, rent 
appropriation by insiders is also ruled out. Profits are therefore normal in both 
quadrants 3 and 4. In quadrant 4, losses (ie less than normal profits) are possible if 
managers seek to appropriate rents and are not well monitored, but only in the very 
short-run. Because there are no VRIN knowledge assets, the normal rate of profit is 
well known and therefore deviations below the rate are easy to police. Insofar as SCA 
and abnormal profits only occur consistently in quadrant 1, governance arrangements 
can be seen as contributing to observable competitive advantage. Of course even here 
the trade-offs referred to in figure 1 still apply, so that increased investment in VRIN 
assets also increases monitoring costs. Therefore abnormal profits and SCA are only 
concurrent where governance mechanisms are effective. An example might be to 
recruit outside directors with sufficient independence from the main board but who at 
the same time possess the firm of sector-specific expertise required to monitor 
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knowledge based assets. However, in the general case, the availability of such 
directors suggests inter-firm knowledge sharing which is in itself inconsistent with 
SCA. 
In view of these difficulties, there are relatively few devices available to 
ensure that the firm operates in quadrant 1. One further possibility is the use of 
ideology, and notions such as ‘shareholder wealth maximization’ and shareholder 
value. Arguably, such notions might be more easily shared between outside investors 
and the firm’s top management. They might therefore employ them to mitigate 
apparently selfish utilization of tacit knowledge, which would otherwise consume 
wealth within the organization. Their effect is limited by their contradictory appeal to 
the selfish interests of another group, ie the shareholders, and because normal, rather 
than abnormal, profits are a sufficient basis for the survival of the firm. 
These trade-offs explain why capitalism is a dynamic system operating within 
social and technically determined limits. There is an incentive to invest in knowledge 
assets insofar as the marginal product is positive net of monitoring costs. Because 
tacitness can rise to the point of total opacity there is an upward limit on the level of 
investment. Similarly there is a downward limit to alienation, since if all processes are 
explicit, although monitoring costs are zero, individual firms cannot achieve 
competitive advantage under R-BV assumptions.
iii
 The realized rate of profit for the 
firm depends on the interaction of these contradictions, but is unrelated to the 
competence or otherwise of the firm’s management, who, where rational will 
appropriate surpluses privately. The rate of surplus accruing to individual workers and 




The argument presented above has accepted the main assumptions of the context 
based R-BV. It has shown that by also accepting a common premise, consistent with 
much of the organizational theory literature and classical economics, that labour is the 
source of value, the R-BV is also consistent with process approaches to strategy 
including labour process theory. It has shown how value originates in the productive 
process and is transmitted as rents to organizational and capital market constituents. 
These assumptions are sufficient to suggest an integrated resource based theory of 
corporate strategy. Without the links, advocated above, to the labour theory of value 
and labour process theory, and mechanisms of corporate governance, the R-BV 
remains merely a view and not a theory, because it lacks a consistent basis for asset 
valuation. The theory also explains that the roots of competitive advantage lie in the 
labour process, but with the corollary that maximizing the associated investment in 
tacit knowledge and associated difficult to replicate assets is fundamentally 
inconsistent with maximizing the value of shareholder’s investments. 
 In summary, the R-BV is either not a theory, or if it is, it must reject the a 
priori assumptions of profit and utility maximization and that have underpinned neo-
classical economics for the last 150 years. Instead the underlying source of value in 
the labour process must be recognised and competitive advantage seen as the outcome 
of the unequal division of surplus between the creators and appropriators of value.  If 
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Extensive Quadrant 1 
• Observed profits: 
Abnormally high 
• SCA: Yes 
 
Quadrant 2 
• Observed profits: 
Normal 






Narrow Quadrant 3 
• Observed profits: 
Normal 
• SCA: No 
 
Quadrant 4 
• Observed profits: 
Normal or losses 





                                                 
Notes 
 
i Labour rents accrue to workers (and managers) where the wage rate exceeds the 
socially necessary labour. Where workers possess knowledge that is not easily 
replicable, particularly when routinized within the organization, possession of such 
knowledge provides workers with opportunities to raise real wages, if they can avoid 
accountability and appropriate the efficiency benefits (see for example efficiency 
wage theories, Katz, 1987). 
 
ii
 For example where abnormal returns from insider stock purchases rise as the firm's 
R&D intensity increases (Coff and Lee, 2003). 
 
iii
 Or more precisely, removing the reification, individual capitalists or investors 
cannot make abnormal returns. 
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